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Respondents Hercules, Inc. and Cigna Insurance Company
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Hercules") hereby file
their response to Petitioner's Petition for Review on appeal to
this Court from the Industrial Commission.

The administrative

law judge ("ALJ") allowed Petitioner's claim for Workers'
Compensation benefits but the Industrial Commission of Utah (the
"Commission") overturned the ALJ and denied Petitioner's claim
for benefits.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1988),
§ 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), § 63-46b-16 (1988), § 78-2a-3(2)(a)
(1988) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Hercules submits that the issues on appeal and the
Standards of Appellant Review are as follows:
(1) Whether the Commission's finding that Petitioner's
work activities did not cause or aggravate his shoulder injury is
supported by substantial evidence.
As medical causation is a factual issue, the proper
standard of review of this question is the "substantial evidence"
test.

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68

(Utah App. 1989) .* The Commission found that Petitioner's
shoulder injury was not medically caused by repetitive motion at
work (R. at 87). Findings of fact must be affirmed if they are
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the Court."

Johnson v. Board of Review, 198

Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1992), citing

Stewart v. Board

of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1989)).

"Substantial evidence is more

than a scintilla of evidence but less than the weight of the
evidence."

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
(2)

Petitioner claims that the Commission committed

error by "comparing the Petitioner's non-job related activities
to his job-related activities in application of the Allen
causation test."

However, this is not an issue in this case

because the Commission did not apply the Allen legal causation
test.

The Commission denied Petitioner's claim based on a lack

of proof of medical causation.

Petitioner argues that the

Commission improperly applied the unusual exertion test which
pertains only to legal causation.

The Commission did not reach

the issue of legal causation, and so could not have misapplied
the test.
Petitioner consistently refers to the inappropriate
standard of "arbitrary disregard of competent evidence in favor
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence." Both the UAPA, §6346b-16, and the current case law make clear that the standard is
as set forth above.
-2-

(3) Whether the Commission committed error through
Commissioner Carlson's walk-through of Petitioner's job site.2
As this is a question of law, the standard of appellate
review is "correction of error,"

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of

Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes are determinative in this
appeal:

Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-88 (1965) and

§ 63-46b-8 (1988), 63-46b-12 (1988) and § 63-46b-16 (1988).

The

determinative statutes are set forth in full in Exhibit "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order
overturning the order of the ALJ and denying his claim for
Workers' Compensation benefits.

The Commission denied

Petitioner's claim for benefits because Petitioner did not prove
that his work activities caused or aggravated his shoulder
injury.
Petitioner states that the third issue on appeal is
"whether evidence required [sic] from a hearing at the job cite
[sic] with only Defendants' representatives present and without
giving adequate notice to the Petitioner and his attorney is
violative of Petitioner's due process rights and renders such
evidence inadmissible." This misstates the issue because
(1) there was not a hearing at the job sitef (2) Petitioner was
given adequate notice of the Commissioner's visit, and (3) there
is nothing in the record to support the claim that any "evidence"
from the walk-through was considered by a majority of the
Commission in reaching its decision.
-3-

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Petitioner filed his application for hearing on
February 26, 1992, seeking recovery of permanent partial
disability benefits.

Petitioner claims that his shoulder was

aggravated by repetitive motion at work at Hercules from 1984
through 1990. Hercules submits that Petitioner's injury was
caused solely by his frequent competitive and recreational
Softball playing and therefore that he is not entitled to
benefits.
A hearing before an ALJ was held on September 2, 1992.
(R. 171). The ALJ concluded that Petitioner's shoulder injury
was aggravated by his work activity and she awarded temporary
total compensation benefits.

Petitioner did not submit a whole

person impairment rating at that time.

(R. 58) . Hercules filed

a motion for review to the Commission on January 21# 1993. On
April 2, 1993, the Commission granted Hercules' motion for review
and denied Petitioner's claim for lack of proof of medical
causation.

(R. 88) .

Statement of Facts
Petitioner has a history of right shoulder pain dating
back to 1986 or 1987.

(R. 198) . In March of 1988, Petitioner

went to see Dr. Lonnie Paulos about his shoulder pain.

(R. 11).

Dr. Paulos' medical records dated March 28, 1988 state that
Petitioner was complaining of right shoulder pain "only with
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throwing, especially from the out field."

Dr. Paulos' records on

that date also state that Petitioner had the shoulder pain for
approximately two years prior to that visit.

Dr. Paulos'

impression on March 28, 1988 was "chronic impingement syndrome
that may be [secondary] to silent subluxation or glenoid labral
biceps evulsion injury."

(R. 11). Finally, Dr. Paulos'

March 28, 1988 records state that Petitioner occasionally
experienced "popping" and "grating" in his shoulder "but has no
symptoms or instability or pain with overhead activity.
only with throwing."

Pain is

(R. 11).

Petitioner visited Dr. Paulos' numerous times after the
initial visit.

On May 11, 1989 Dr. Paulos' records regarding

Petitioner state "worse with playing softball, had improvement
with injection."

(R. 13). On February 15, 1990 Dr. Paulos'

records state "the current patient diagnosis is right shoulder
chronic impingement . . . increased pain, positive night pain."
(R. 14). On October 25, 1990, Dr. Paulos' notes state "patient
still doing poorly, wants scope subacromial debridement."
(R. 16). None of the above medical records mention any
connection to Petitioner's work activities.

On November 14,

1990, Dr. Paulos performed surgery on Petitioner's shoulder.
24).

(R.

Petitioner continued to see Dr. Paulos after his surgery.

On April 25, 1991 Dr. Paulos' notes state that Petitioner was
"doing well" and "he wants to start long throws."

-5-

(R. 21).

Dr. Paulos' medical records say nothing of any link
between Petitioner's shoulder injury and his work activities
until January 14, 1991, nearly three years after his first
treatment with Dr. Paulos.

(R. 4 ) . On January 14, 1991, Dr.

Paulos stated in a letter to "Whom It May Concern" that "Cory had
damaged his shoulder through his occupational duties and various
sports activities."

(R. 4).

Dr. Paulos' notes from Petitioner's first visit state
that Petitioner played 200 plus softball games per year.
(R. 11). Petitioner testified at the hearing before the ALJ that
he played recreational and competitive softball but did not play
200 games a year.

(R. 229). Though Petitioner had been seeing

Dr. Paulos since 1988, Dr. Paulos' medical records do not even
hint that Petitioner's condition may be work related until the
January 14, 1991 letter.

Indeed, Petitioner stated at the

hearing before the ALJ that he and Dr. Paulos did not discuss his
work maneuvers in much detail.

(R. 221).

Petitioner claims he began feeling shoulder pain at
work as early as 1986 or 1987, but did not notify Hercules until,
at the very earliest, November of 1990.

(R. 208). Petitioner

testified that he reported his shoulder problems to the nurse at
the Hercules clinic in November of 1990. The nurse asked if
Petitioner wanted to file a Workers Compensation claim, but
Petitioner decided not to do so at that time.

-6-

(R. 208).

In addition to the January 14, 1991 letter, Dr. Paulos
wrote two more letters regarding the cause of Petitioner's
injury, one on September 1, 1992, the day before the hearing with
the ALJ, and one on September 4, 1992, two days after the
hearing.

(R. 39-40).

Dr. Paulos' September 1, 1922 letter

states in part:
I have thoroughly reviewed the abovereferenced patient's chart and find that his
shoulder problem was mainly caused from
sports activity. In fact, at the time of his
first office visit to our clinic, he was
specifically asked if this was a work-related
problem and he responded in the negative.
However, in thorough questioning we did find
that the type of work he performed aggravated
the shoulder as did the sports activity. It
is possible that his work did thus aggravate
the problem along with the sports activities
but I feel safe in stating that it did not
cause the problem originally. In fact, the
patient stated to us that he had suffered a
baseball injury two years before presenting
to us which he felt was the inciting
incident.
(R. 39). Dr. Paulos' September 4 letter to Petitioner's attorney
states in part

fl

Our records reveal that the Patient presented to

us with shoulder soreness when throwing in softball. After
thorough questioning, we also found out that the patient's work
functions aggravated the shoulder as well. . . .

We cannot

determine which was the worst of the aggravating problems -- both
contributed equally."

(R. 40).

Despite Dr. Paulos' statements regarding "thorough
questioning," the applicant made it clear at the hearing that he
-7-

had never discussed his work activities with Dr. Paulos in any
depth,

(R. 220, 233) . In contrast, he admitted that Dr. Richard

E. Johns, Jr. observed him on the job and went over every single
move the Petitioner made.

(R. 196). Dr. Johns is the medical

director at the Hercules clinic.

His duties include helping

employees with post injury rehabilitation.

Dr. Johns talked with

Petitioner about his Softball playing and performed an ergonomic
evaluation to assess the risk that Petitioner would aggravate his
shoulder if he returned to work.

Dr. Johns' ergonomic tests

included studying pictures of Petitioner's work tasks and
personally watching Petitioner perform his work activities.
(R. 228) . After talking with Petitioner and actually observing
him work, Dr. Johns wrote:
It would be my opinion that his intermittent
upper extremity work as a machinist at
Hercules would not have caused his right
shoulder impingement syndrome. It appears
more medically plausible that for his age,
baseball and perhaps other intensive
recreational activities are more likely to
have caused his condition.
(R. 168).
The ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner, relying on
Dr. Paulos' letters rather than Dr. Johns' opinion.

(R. 57).

The Commission granted Hercules' motion for review and overturned
the ALJ's ruling.

(R. 87). The Commission concluded "based on

the evidence of record . . . there is insufficient evidence to
show that the work place caused or aggravated the shoulder injury
-8-

alleged . . . the shoulder injury alleged was pre-existing and
was caused by Softball and other recreational activities."
87).

(R.

The Commission found that Dr. Paulos' records regarding the

medical cause of the injury were inconclusive.

(R. 87). The

Commission relied on Dr. Johns' report because Dr. Johns visited
the work place and watched Petitioner work.

(R. 87). The

Commission also emphasized that Dr. Johns' letter of April 1#
1992 specifically stated that Petitioner's "intermittent upper
extremity work as a machinist at Hercules would not have caused
his shoulder impingement syndrome."

(R. 86). In addition, the

Commission noted that Dr. Paulos' medical records did not connect
Petitioner's injury to his work activities and did not even
mention work activities until January of 1991.

(R. 86). The

Commission concluded that if Petitioner had experienced pain on
the job, he would have reported it.

(R. 87).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner seeks Workers' Compensation benefits based
on an injury which was caused by his frequent Softball playing
and is not related to his work activities.

The Commission found

that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving medical
causation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Petitioner relies

on several letters from Dr. Lonnie Paulos to prove medical
causation.

However, Dr. Paulos' records are conflicting.

Petitioner began seeing Dr. Paulos in 1988, but there is no

-9-

mention of Petitioner's work activities in Dr. Paulos' records
until January of 1991. Dr. Paulos' statements of causation are
inconclusive, inconsistent and do not amount to proof of medical
causation.
This Court should uphold the ruling of the Commission
because it is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the entire record.

The Commission's role is to review

factual evidence, such as evidence of medical causation, and make
a determination based on the evidence.

The Commission relied on

Dr. Johns' opinion that Petitioner's injury was not caused or
aggravated by his work activities. Dr. Johns concluded that
Petitioner's injury was caused by frequent softball playing.

The

Commission found that Dr. Johns' opinion was credible because he
visited the job site and watched and studied Petitioner's work
motions.

Dr. Johns' opinion alone is substantial evidence of no

medical causation.

Even if Dr. Paulos' statements regarding

medical causation had been clear and consistent, the Commission's
reliance on Dr. Johns' opinion is justified because it is
substantial evidence and the Commission's duty is to resolve
issues of fact.
The Commission did not commit error in comparing
Petitioner's non job-related activities to his job-related
activities in applying the Allen legal causation test, because it
did not apply the Allen test. The Commission found that
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Petitioner did not prove medical causation.

The Commission based

this on the lack of proof of medical causation provided by
Petitioner and the affirmative proof of no medical causation
provided by Dr. Johns. The Commission did not compare
Petitioner's employment activities to his nonemployment
activities for the purpose of determining whether there was an
unusual exertion.

It made the comparison to illustrate that

Petitioner's out-of-work activities were unusual and therefore
supported the finding that Petitioner's out-of-work activities
were the medical cause of his shoulder injury.

The Commission

did not reach the question of legal causation because it found
that Petitioner did not prove medical causation and therefore,
the Commission could not have misapplied the Allen test.
Commissioner Carlson's visit to Petitioner's work place
did not violate Petitioner's due process rights. A majority of
the Commission had decided to deny benefits prior to Commissioner
Carlson's visit.

Even if this Court excludes any evidence

gathered from the visit, the Commission's ruling would be the
same.

Moreover, Commissioner Carlson's visit to the work place

did not violate Petitioner's due process rights because it was
not a hearing.

As a Commissioner, Commissioner Carlson has a

statutory right and obligation to investigate a claim and
investigations are not necessarily hearings.

Finally,

Petitioner's counsel was given adequate notice of the walk-
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through and when Petitioner or his counsel did not show,
Hercules' counsel did not participate in the walk-through.

The

Commission did not hold a hearing; it conducted an investigation
of which all parties were given notice.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
HIS INJURY WAS CAUSED BY FREQUENT SOFTBALL PLAYING AND THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO MEDICAL CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A.

Petitioner Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving Medical
Causation.
In order to receive Workers' Compensation benefits,

Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
shoulder injury was caused by an industrial accident.

Large v.

Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988).

"The

medical causation requirement will prevent an employer from
becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims."
27 (Utah App. 1986).

Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15,
In order to prove medical causation,

Petitioner must provide conclusive evidence of a connection
between his shoulder injury and his work activities.

Lancaster

v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1987).
Lancaster is very similar to this case.

In Lancaster,

the petitioner argued that his work activities at high altitude
and in cold weather caused his heart attack.

The petitioner's

personal physician opined that his work activities contributed to
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his injury.

Petitioner's physician testified that the working

conditions "probably" precipitated the heart attack.

Id. at 239.

The ALJ sent the case to a medical panel and the medical panel
doctor stated ". . .while it is possible the cold exposure and
his exertion had a role in precipitating the myocardial
infarction, . . . it is unlikely they played a significant role."
Id. at 240. The

Lancaster Court held:

[n]ot one of the doctors was willing to state
with medical certainty that the claimant's
injury was caused by work-related factors.
Thus, there is competent and comprehensive
medical evidence in the record upon which the
Administrative Law Judge could rely in
concluding that medical causation was
lacking.
Though the Lancaster Court applied the old standard of appellate
review and not the "substantial evidence test," it still stands
for the proposition that the applicant must provide conclusive
proof of medical causation.

Id.

at 240.

In this case, Petitioner has also failed to meet his
burden of proof.

The Commission found that Petitioner's shoulder

condition was not caused or aggravated by repetitive motion at
work (R. 87). In making that determination the Commission
concluded that Dr. Paulos' letters addressing medical causation
were inconclusive and insufficient to meet the burden of proof.
(R. 86-87).
Dr. Paulos wrote three letters regarding medical
causation, but his opinion on the subject is unclear. Dr.
-13-

Paulos' January 14, 1991 letter says, "Cory has damaged his
shoulder through his occupational duties and various sports
activities."

(R. 4). Dr. Paulos' September 1, 1992 letter

states that his shoulder problem was mainly caused from sports
activities, but in the same letter Dr. Paulos states, "However,
in thorough questioning we did find that the type of work he
performed aggravated the shoulder as did the sports activity.

It

is possible that his work did thus aggravate the problem along
with the sports activities but I feel safe in saying that it did
not cause the problem originally."

(R. 39).

(Emphasis added.)

Finally, on September 4, 1992 Dr. Paulos sent another letter to
Petitioner's counsel.

In that letter Dr. Paulos stated in part,

"After thorough questioning we also found out that the patient's
work functions aggravated the shoulder as well.

We cannot

determine which was the worst of the aggravating problems -- both
contributed equally."

(R. 40).

(Emphasis in original.)

The Petitioner had been seeing Dr. Paulos for about
three years but the January 14, 1991 letter is the first time
that Dr. Paulos even hints that Petitioner's injury may have been
aggravated at work.

Petitioner and Dr. Paulos did not even

discuss Petitioner's work activities in much detail.
233).

(R. 221,

Indeed, Dr. Paulos states in his September 1, 1992 letter

that, "The patient stated to us that he had suffered a baseball
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injury two years before presenting to us which he felt was the
inciting incident."

(R. 4 ) ,

Dr. Paulos' records regarding medical causation are
inconclusive at best. They certainly do not rise to the level of
"medical certainty" or "conclusive evidence."

Dr. Paulos'

records do not prove medical causation by a preponderance of the
evidence, nor do they prove that Petitioner's work activities
amounted to a permanent, ratable aggravation of his Softball
injury.

In Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah

App. 1990), this Court held that an aggravation of a preexisting
condition is not compensable if it is a temporary aggravation or
a nonratable acceleration of symptoms.

Id.

Only a permanent,

ratable aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable.
Id.
In Virgin, the petitioner sought workers' compensation
benefits for a hip replacement claiming that his hip condition
was aggravated by an industrial accident.

The ALJ appointed a

medical panel of one orthopedic surgeon who stated, "I think
perhaps it happened sooner than it would have had he not had an
injury, but I feel he would have ultimately needed surgery on
this in spite of any industrial injury..."

The doctor was unable

to assign a degree of permanent or temporary impairment due to
the accident.

Id. at 1286. Based on the doctor's statement the
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ALJ found that the industrial accident was causally connected to
the hip replacement.
In Virgin, as in this case, the Commission reviewed the
case and overturned the ALJ's Order and findings.

On review to

this Court, the petitioner in Virgin argued that, because the
medical panel found that the industrial accident aggravated his
preexisting condition, his hip replacement was compensable.

Id.

at 1287. This Court stated that the Commission, not the ALJ, is
the ultimate finder of fact and may choose to give certain
evidence more weight than other evidence.

This Court held that

there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's
finding of no medical causation.

2d. at 1290.

In this case, there is no conclusive evidence that
Petitioner's work activities contributed to or permanently
aggravated his preexisting softball injury.

Therefore,

Petitioner has not provided proof of medical causation and that
alone is substantial evidence to support the Commission's
decision.

More significantly, there is conclusive evidence from

Dr. Johns that Petitioner's softball activities, not his work
activities, injured his shoulder.
B.

The Commission's Finding of no Medical Causation is
Supported by Substantial Evidence.
The Commission's role is to resolve factual disputes

and in this case the Commission found that Petitioner's work
activities did not cause or aggravate his shoulder injury.
-16-

It is

not error for the Commission to choose one medical opinion over
another or to rely on certain facts and discount others.

"It is

the province of the Board not the Appellate Courts, to resolve
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the
inferences."

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, citing Board of

Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter. 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186,
1193 (1985).

Dr. Johns' opinion was that Petitioner's injury was

not caused by work but, most likely, by recreational activities.
(R. 168). After reviewing the evidence, the Commission found
that Dr. Paulos' statements regarding causation were inconclusive
and it relied on Dr. Johns' opinion in making its determination.
In Olsen v. Industrial Commission, 797 P.2d 1098 (Utah
1990), the Supreme Court of Utah held that when confronted with
conflicting evidence of medical causation the ALJ and/or the
Commission is to decide which evidence is more credible under the
circumstances.

The Olsen Court upheld the ALJ and the Commission

stating that the ALJ articulated sound reasons for choosing one
medical opinion over another.

Id. at 1100.

In this case, the Commission relied on Dr. Johns'
opinion because it was conclusive and because he personally
performed ergonomic tests. Dr. Johns had first-hand knowledge of
the information needed to determine the causation issue.
Dr. Johns went to the job site, observed Petitioner doing his
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job, took photographs and studied Petitioner's movements.
Indeed, the Petitioner himself testified at the hearing that
Dr. Johns went over every single move and took pictures.
(R. 196). In addition, Dr. Johns interviewed Petitioner
regarding his Softball activities.

(R. 168) . Dr. Johns

determined from reviewing the medical records and observing and
studying Petitioner at work that his work activities did not
cause his shoulder condition.

(R. 168) . In contrast, Dr. Paulos

never witnessed Petitioner's work motions and he and Petitioner
never discussed Petitioner's job activities in depth.

(R. 221,

233).
On page 22 of Petitioner's Brief, Petitioner attempts
to undermine the credibility of Dr. Johns' opinion.

However, the

Commission found Dr. Johns' opinion credible and therefore this
Court "should inquire only whether the findings are arbitrary and
capricious."

Olsen. 797 P.2d at 1100.

Petitioner argues that Dr. Johns' testing was done to
determine whether or not his job activities would pose a risk of
reinjury in the future and that Dr. Johns found that Petitioner's
activities as a machinist would pose a risk of reinjury.
However, this was after Petitioner had been injured playing
Softball and after he had shoulder surgery.

It is no basis to

infer that the activities could have caused the prior problems,
especially in the face of the contrary, express conclusion
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Dr. Johns reached.

Petitioner also argues that Dr. Johns did not

physically examine Petitioner.

This is irrelevant, because Dr.

Johns did not doubt the diagnosis, but was trying to determine
the cause of the problems.

To do that he interviewed Petitioner

and went to the job site and saw what Petitioner did on a daily
basis.

This gives Dr. Johns more relevant facts for rendering an

opinion than Dr. Paulos had because he was able to see and study
Petitioner's job motions.

Finally, Petitioner argues that

Dr. Johns may be biased because he is employed by Hercules. This
is no basis to discount the opinion of an experienced, credible
physician.

Respondents could also argue that as Dr. Paulos has

been seeing Petitioner for almost five years, he may also be
biased.

Neither argument carries much weight.

The reality is

probably that neither Dr. Johns nor Dr. Paulos is biased but each
is simply attempting to give a medical opinion to the best of
their ability.
Dr. Johns' opinion is substantial evidence of no
medical causation.

Even if we were to assume that Dr. Paulos

concluded that Petitioner's injury was permanently aggravated by
his work activities, the Commission could justifiably choose to
rely on Dr. Johns' conclusion.
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II.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT REACH THE ISSUE OF LEGAL CAUSATION,
SO PETITIONER'S SECOND POINT IS INAPPLICABLE.
In Allen, 729 P.2d at 25, the Supreme Court of Utah

adopted a two part test for analyzing causation.

The Court

stated that an applicant must prove medical causation and, if the
applicant has a pre-existing condition, he must prove legal
causation.

With regard to legal causation the Allen Court

stated, "To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with
a pre-existing condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his condition."

Id. at 25.

With regard to medical causation the Allen Court stated, "Under
the medical cause test, the claimant must show by evidence,
opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required
by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or
disability.

In the event the claimant cannot show a medical

causal connection, compensation should be denied."

Id. at 27.

In this case, the Commission denied Petitioner's claim
based on the lack of proof of medical causation.

The Commission

stated, "We conclude after reviewing the entire file that the
applicant's shoulder problem was caused by his intensive softball
activities, and that there is no credible evidence that his work
place activities contributed in any degree to his shoulder
injury."

(R. 86.)

The Commission did not reach the issue of

legal causation.
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Petitioner argues that the Commission held him to a
higher standard in proving causation because of his unusual
nonemployment activities.

Petitioner stated, "The Industrial

Commission is stating that because the Petitioner was playing
competitive and recreational softball that his non-industrial
activities involved unusual exertion and thus, somehow would
raise the 'unusual exertion' in the work place standard under
Allen to a higher level."

(Petitioner's Brief p 25.)

This

argument misses the point because the unusual exertion standard
is involved only in legal causation analysis, not medical
causation analysis and, as indicated in Commission's Order,
Petitioner's claim was denied on medical causation grounds. It
is irrelevant whether Petitioner's work constituted an unusual
exertion because, even if his exertion was unusual, it did not
cause his shoulder injury.

The Commission does make reference to

Petitioner's extensive softball playing, but only as additional
evidence that Petitioner's softball playing, not his work
activities, was the medical cause of his shoulder injury.
(R. 86-87).
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III. THE COMMISSIONER DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS BY VISITING THE JOB SITE.
A,

The Visit Did Not Affect the Commission's Order and is,
at Most, Harmless Error,
On August 17, 1993, Commissioner Thomas R. Carlson

visited the Hercules plant
by the applicant."

lf

in order to view the machine operated

(R. 87). None of the other Commissioners

participated in this walk-through.

(R. 87).

Petitioner's

counsel was invited to attend the walk-through but did not do so.
Because Petitioner's counsel did not appear for the walk-through
Hercules' counsel also did not participate.

(R. 87) .

The two Commissioners who did not participate in the
walk-through, a majority of the Commission, had decided, before
the walk-through, to grant the Hercules motion for review for
lack of proof of medical causation.3
at most, harmless error.

Therefore, the visit was,

In Morton International v. Auditincr

Division. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court stated
that the language in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4), which deals
with appellate courts' standard of review of formal adjudication
proceedings, "is similar to language in the rules of procedure
and evidence dealing with harmless error."

3

Id.

The Court

See the affidavit of the then-counsel for the Industrial
Commission, Benjamin A. Sims at 1 7 (attached as Exhibit " B " ) .
Mr. Sims assisted in finalizing the Commission's order before the
visit took place, and the other two Commissioners who did not
visit the job site "never wavered" in their decision to reverse
the ALJ.
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concluded, therefore, that the legislature intended that the
harmless error standard used in appeals from judicial proceedings
should also be applied in appeals from agency proceedings. Id.
Therefore, error is harmless if it is "sufficiently
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."

Id. citing

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
In this case, it is clear that the walk-through had no
effect on the Commission's determination.

Two of the three

Commissioners did not participate in the walk-through and had
decided to grant the motion for Review before the walk-through.
Affidavit of Benjamin A. Sims at ^ 7 attached as Exhibit "B".
Even if any "evidence" gathered by Commissioner Carlson from the
walk-through is excluded or his vote is ignored altogether, the
outcome is the same. With or without the walk-through, a
majority of the Commission found, based on Dr. John's opinion and
the other evidence in the record, that Petitioner's job was not
the cause of his injury.

Because the alleged error was harmless,

the Order must be upheld.
B.

The Commission Did Not Hold a Hearing at the Job Site.
Petitioner argues that Commissioner Carlson's walk-

through was a formal adjudicative proceeding and that Petitioner
was given insufficient notice and therefore denied due process.
Petitioner cites U.C.A. § 63-46b-8 for the proposition that he
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should have been given the opportunity to present his point of
view during the walk-through.

However, § 63-46b-8 pertains only

to hearings in formal adjudicative proceedings, and there is no
basis to conclude that it applies to one Commissioner's
independent investigation of the case.

Indeed, the Commission's

review of the ALJ's decision is governed by U.C.A. § 63-46b-12
(1988), not § 63-46b-8. There is nothing in § 12 which precludes
an investigation.

In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1965)

expressly gives the Commission power to investigate.

It states

"[t]he Commission may make its investigation in such manner as in
its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the
Workers' Compensation Act."

U.C.A. § 35-1-88 does not require

that any or all parties must be present when the Commission
conducts its investigation.

Therefore, there is no due process

violation, because the statute Petitioner relies upon was not
violated.
C.

Petitioner Was Given Adequate Notice of and Was Invited
to Attend the Visit to the Job Site.
Even though it was not a hearing, Commissioner Carlson

invited the parties to attend the walk-through.
Sims Affidavit at U 3.

(R. 77-81).

Petitioner claims that he was not given

timely notice of Commissioner Carlson's walk-through.
shows otherwise.

The record

Benjamin A. Sims, who was general counsel for

the Industrial Commission at the time, notified Petitioner on
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March 8, 1993 by telephone that the walk-through was planned for
March 17.

Sims Affidavit at 5 3.

Petitioner's attorney did not

say at that time that he could not attend nor did he object to
the walk-through.

Sims Affidavit at 5 4.

Also, on March 10,

1993 Petitioner's attorney was notified by telephone of the
confirmed date and time of the walk-through.
5 5.

Sims Affidavit at

Finally, on March 15, 1993, Petitioner's attorney was sent

a letter and a fax notifying him of the walk-through.
Affidavit at 5 6.)4 (R. 77, 80-81).

Sims

Petitioner's counsel never

objected to the walk-through until after it happened, and both
parties to this action received the same amount of notice.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Hercules respectfully
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review
and affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission.

The April 2,

1993, Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed
because Petitioner did not prove medical causation.

Dr. Johns'

opinion that Petitioner's softball activities and not his work
activities caused his shoulder injury is substantial evidence to
support the Commission's finding of no medical causation.
Petitioner's version of the events is inconsistent with the
record. He claims his counsel did not receive written notice of
the walk-through until the afternoon of March 16th. (R. 82).
The Commission's records show that he received the fax on the
morning of March 15 (R. 77, 80-81), and a phone call on March
10th. (R. 77). Additionally, he first learned of it on March
8th, nine days in advance. Sims Affidavit at 55 3 and 4.
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Commissioner Carlson did not commit error in visiting the job
site but, in any event, the Commissioner's walk-through had
absolutely no effect on the Commission's decision, and gives rise
to no basis for reversal.
DATED this ->

day of August, 1993,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven
Aeschbacher
George S. Adondakis
Attorneys for Respondents
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the
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to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals (1 original and 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Wayne Freestone (2 copies)
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Bank One Tower, #900
50 West 300 South
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Thomas C. Sturdy (2 copies)
Sharon J. Eblen
Attorneys for Respondent Industrial Commission of Utah
160 E. 300 South
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600

41585.01\gsa

-27-

35-1-88- Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing examiner
— Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The
commission may make its investigation in such manireT~H5"iTr1tglu5gment is best gTcuTate&Jg ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out
justly the spirit ot the Workmen'j^Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the
following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented
in open hearings.
*
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of
time sheets, book accounts or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
diseased employee.
1965
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63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988
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63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) Ifa statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose by the statute or rule.
<b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was
mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period provided
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer.
(3) Ifa statute or the agency's rules require review
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
agency or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
Cviii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
1988
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63-46b-8.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections^63-46b-3(d)([)
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer:

(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in
the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts
that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of
other proceedings before the agency, and of
technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the
agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose
to protect confidential information disclosed at
the hearing,
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to
preserve the integrity of the hearing.
1988
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I, Benjamin A. Sims, do hereby swear that the following is
true to be best of my recollection, based upon my personal
knowledge of the events herein. At the time of the events recited
in this affidavit I was the general counsel of the Industrial
Commission of Utah. I provide these comments in connection with
the case Chase v. Ind. Comm/n et al.. Case No. 930271-CA which has
been filed with the Utah Court of Appeals
1. On or about March 7, 1993, I was called into Commissioner
Carlson's office to discuss the motion for review and the facts of
the Cory Chase case. Commissioners' Hadley and Colton were also
present. The Commissioners had individually reviewed the Chase
file, and Commissioner Carlson was unsure whether to uphold the
administrative law judge (who had ruled in favor of Chase) or to
determine that the alleged injury was not industrially related.
2. Commissioner Carlson determined after discussion that he
desired to view the machine which Chase claimed had caused his
injury. The other two Commissioners determined that they did not
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want to attend because they believed that the evidence showed that
the alleged injury was not industrially related. Commissioner
Carlson then checked his calendar and determined that he could view
the machine on March 17, 1993 when he returned from an out-of-town
trip.
3. It is my recollection that shortly thereafter I called
Steve Aeschbacher, counsel for Hercules on March 8, 1993 to set up
the visit for the afternoon of March 17, 1993. I then called Wayne
Freestone on the same date, and informed him that at least one of
the Commissioners would visit Hercules on March 17, 1993 for a site
viewing, and that he and his client should be on notice.
4. Mr. Freestone informed me that he would be at the prison on
that date, and that he would prefer the visit to be on another date
or as late as possible.
I asked him if this date would be
impossible or merely a problem, and he replied that it would not be
impossible and that he might have to leave the prison early in
order to be there.
After reviewing Commissioner Carlson's
calendar, it was decided that this was the best date to have the
visit, and so the visit was left on the calendar at 2:00 p.m. on
March 17, 1993 since the Commissioner did not want to get involved
in a shift change which would occur at 4:00 p.m.
5. Mr. Freestone was again informed on March 10, 1993 by
telephone of the confirmed date and time. No mention was made by
Mr. Freestone that either he or his client could not attend.
6. On March 15, 1993, both a letter and a fax were sent to Mr.
Freestone in order for him to be admitted to Hercules, and again
informing him of the date and time of the visit to Hercules. The
first notice the Commission received that Mr. Freestone or his
client would not attend was delivered to the Commission on March
17, 1993.
7. Commissioner Carlson went to Hercules alone, and no other
Commission personnel, or Commissioners were in attendance.
Commissioners Hadley and Colton had told me from the very beginning
that they did not desire to go, although I did notify the parties
that they might attend, and I assisted these two Commissioners from
the time of the first meeting in finalizing the order of the
Commissioners which is reflected in the order of April 2, 1993.
There were no meetings with all three Commissioners subsequent to
the March 7, 1993 meeting to discuss this case, and Commissioners'
Hadley and Colton never wavered in their view that the evidence
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showed that Mr. Chase's injury was not industrially related.
DATED THIS ,^-G

Day of August 1993. 7
-BENJ.
/

(

CERTIFICATE OF FILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
Affidavit of Benjamin A. Sims was hand delivered±>y me personally
to the Utah Court of Appeals this <2&j£ day of cn^£LJ^<^f
,
1993.
— 7 7 -

Sharon J. Eblen
Associate General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the £-*hr/\ day of
6^' a ^ < ^7 .
1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the foregoing Afffdavit of
Benjamin A. Sims to the following:
Steven J. Aeschbacher
George S. Adondakis
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 S. MAIN ST.
P.O. BOX 45385
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-0385
WAYNE A. FREESTONE
50 WEST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101

Sharon J .
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